This study shows that order flow in a foreign exchange market appears to have permanent price impact only if it comes from certain regions. These regions are -as predicted by the local information hypothesis -centers of political and financial decision making. It is revealing that orders from other regions only show a very short-lived but no permanent price impact. Local information is so important that it carries over from the usually considered market orders to aggressively priced limit orders too. The finding is robust to common news shocks, to the consideration of feedback trading and to further controls.
Introduction
In light of the failure of the traditional macro approach in exchange rate modeling the microstructure analysis of currency markets seems to provide new insights (see e.g. Frankel and Rose, 1995 , Lyons, 2001 , and Sarno and Taylor, 2002 . In a sense, it reverses the conventional top down macro perspective by analyzing trader behavior bottom up. Assuming that market participants are asymmetrically informed, it seems worthwhile to analyze behavior at the microstructure level in order to better understand who has information and in which way this information gets into prices. One plausible source of information advantage could be local proximity to centers of decision making. Goodhart and Figliuoli (1992) "regard it as inevitable that some aspects of news [in foreign exchange] will differ between geographical locations". Obviously, an analysis testing the potential price impact of local information requires transaction data where currency orders can be linked to locations. This paper is the first, due to a new data set, that is able to examine this question exactly. We find clear evidence supporting the notion of local information advantage in foreign exchange markets.
The possible existence of local information advantages in financial markets does not seem to be self-evident in times of the internet and other modern instruments of communication. These instruments may nourish some skepticism and, indeed, enough studies demonstrate that investments in local assets are often based on home bias instead of an information advantage (e.g. Huberman, 2001 ). Nevertheless, the careful analysis of locally rooted information asymmetries has brought about overwhelming evidence during the last years that local information still exists, even in modern globalized markets. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) identify performance advantages of fund managers that invest in local firms, Hau (2001) shows that trading profits are higher for local equity traders, Ivković and Weisbenner (2005) find that local equity investments of individual investors earn higher risk-adjusted returns and Malloy (2005) demonstrates superior forecasting performance of analysts for firms within the analysts' region (see also Bae, Stulz and Tan, 2005) . So, local proximity to centers of decision making, such as firm headquarters, can provide an information advantage. Recently, Berger, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) have extended this line of research to monetary policy forecasting and find that
Frankfurt-based analysts predict interest rate changes of the European Central Bank significantly bet-ter than others. Obviously, local information advantages do not only appear in stock markets but also in the domain of macroeconomic fundamentals which is of particular importance for foreign exchange.
In contrast to this strong evidence for equity and money markets, there is hardly any outright test of the local information hypothesis in foreign exchange. Goodhart and Figliuoli (1992) are the first to examine local information asymmetries in foreign exchange. They find some evidence that indeed price movements between centers, such as London and New York, show negative correlation in returns, indicating different information sets, whereas price movements within locations do not. Peiers (1997) compares the quotes of single banks analyzing potential price leadership in the mark/dollar market around interventions of the Deutsche Bundesbank. She shows that at least one German bank seems to be better informed than others (but there is no such effect for US interventions according to Dominguez, 2003) . De Jong et al. (2001) extend this work, among other things by considering more banks, and find a slight tendency but no unanimous proof of a local information hypothesis. Sapp (2002) identifies different price-leading banks in the European and the US market, again without a clear relation to the location of these banks' headquarters. Whereas these studies are actually interested in potential price leadership of single banks, Covrig and Melvin (2002) disaggregate the yen/dollar market into Japanese and other quotes and find that Japanese traders lead the market under certain circumstances. So there is some first evidence in favor of the local information hypothesis, but all these analyses are limited by the fact that they have to rely on indicative quotes which differ from prices (Daníelsson and Payne, 2002) .
Therefore, it seems highly warranted to examine the hypothesis of a local information advantage in foreign exchange markets with better data. For this purpose, we can rely on the full record of orders in a modern electronic foreign exchange market, i.e. the Russian interbank Russian rouble -US dollar market. Fortunately, all orders can be linked unanimously to one of eight different regions in Russia.
This allows a straightforward test of the local information hypothesis by applying the standard concept of price impact analysis (Hasbrouck, 1991 (Hasbrouck, , 2006 . Accordingly, all kinds of microstructural effects, such as liquidity-induced price impacts, compensate each other and disappear over time -the only price impact that will be of permanent nature is due to information. As this concept is very well established in the literature it can be used as a reliable method to test the local information hypothesis: 1 if there are regions which are better informed, trades from these regions should have a high permanent price impact whereas order flow from regions without any systematic information advantage should have a smaller permanent price impact or only temporary impacts on exchange rates due to liquidity effects.
Following the local information literature, regions are better informed when they host centers of decision making. In foreign exchange, this applies to two kinds of institutions: first, institutions which generate or inform about public information, such as the central bank or ministries, and second, institutions which interpret public information better than others or which have access to private information from financial institutions by receiving their order flow (Lyons, 1997) . 2 In Russia, the political, financial and economic center is all in one place, i.e. Moscow. The only other region that can be considered as possibly better informed than the average is the country's second largest city, St. Petersburg. As orders reflect the location of the trading bank and its customer base, the local information hypothesis predicts that order flow from Moscow -possibly from St. Petersburg too -has more price impact than orders from Russia's periphery. Of course, there will be noise in the data as not every bank or its customers in Moscow will be better informed than others in the large country. However, this only heightens the stakes when testing the local information hypothesis.
At the core of our research, we find that only trades from the regions Moscow and St. Petersburg have permanent price impact in the Russian rouble -US dollar market, i.e. provide information.
Trades from the other six Russian regions also show some short-lived price impact, which disappears, however, within a few minutes. This result provides strong evidence in favor of the local information hypothesis in foreign exchange markets. In fact, it is new evidence for foreign exchange markets based on trading data.
We further substantiate the importance of local information by considering limit orders, i.e. orders that are not executed immediately, for the first time in foreign exchange. Results show that not only the usually considered market orders (see e.g. Evans and Lyons, 2002, Payne, 2003) but also aggressively priced limit orders from both center regions provide information whereas those from other regions do not. Moreover, we show that findings are robust. They hold when we consider the possibility of common news shocks, i.e. a joint influence on order flow and prices, they hold when we allow for feedback trading, i.e. influences from ongoing price changes on order flow, and they hold when we control for sample splits, market conditions and trader size.
Due to the new and detailed data being used here, this paper also provides evidence on related lines of recent research. First, it increases credence of the local information hypothesis in general because there has been no other study testing the local information hypothesis by the price impact approach, according to the best of our knowledge. Second, the new evidence highlights the importance of limit orders for information processing. It supports recent findings of an experimental study by Bloomfield, O'Hara and Saar (2005) , findings for the US equity market studied by Kaniel and Liu (2006) and it motivates to disaggregate limit orders according to their economic purpose (see Hasbrouck and Saar, 2004) . Third, the evidence on local information in foreign exchange markets supports the view that order flow indeed conveys information.
3
This paper continues with a description of the market structure under consideration, data and descriptive statistics in Section 2. Section 3 analyzes price impacts of different regions and extends the analysis to different order types, common news shocks and feedback trading. Section 4 provides further robustness tests and Section 5 concludes.
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Market structure, data, and descriptive statistics
Market structure and dealing system
The institutional structure of the Russian electronic FX interbank market is typical for a modern electronic market and has completely changed since June 29, 1999 (Goldberg and Tenorio, 1997, ana- lyze an earlier market structure). Although volumes are low compared to leading currencies in the world, 4 a very similar market structure and behavior seems to allow transfer of insights to other electronic currency and security markets.
The market is organized as a multiple dealer market without designated market makers or brokers. This electronic market is restricted to dealers who are located at one of the market's participating 3 See for different approaches e.g. Bjønnes and Rime and Solheim (2004) , Ito, Lyons and Melvin (1998) , Cheung and Chinn (2001) , Evans (2002) , Osler (2003) , Gehrig and Menkhoff (2004) , Evans and Lyons (2005, 2005a) , Killeen, Lyons and Moore (2006) , Dominguez and Panthaki (2006) and more critically Breedon and Vitale (2005) . 4 Trading in the Russian rouble (RUR) has a tiny but steadily increasing share of total turnover which amounts to 0.4% of total world currency trading volume (BIS, 2002, Trading in the UTS takes place on the electronic system SELT which is very similar to the systems of Reuters or the EBS consortium prevailing in major currency markets. 9 SELT features only two order types, namely limit orders and cancellation orders. A limit order is an order to buy or sell a quantified US dollar volume to a pre-specified price or better, i.e. higher for selling and lower for buying orders. Submitted limit orders are stored in an electronic order book that has clear priority rules.
Marketable limit orders are executed immediately against the best price available and are thus classified as market orders. 10 Cancellation orders may be used to cancel existing limit orders that have not 5 The MICEX is also the main Russian exchange for all kinds of financial assets such as equities and bonds. 6 However, there occurred no intervention in our sample period. 7 The regions are Ekaterinburg, Moscow, N. Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Rostov, Samara, St. Petersburg.and Vladivostock. 8 The RUR/USD trading was almost completely concentrated in Russia, only very minor fractions took place in other markets (BIS, 2002) . Moreover, these markets hardly overlap due to two to three hours time difference with Moscow (Central Europe and London, respectively). 9 SELT was in fact developed in cooperation with Reuters. 10 Payne (2003, p. 312 ) also classifies crossing limit-orders as market orders, though the trading system Reuters D2000-2 analyzed there contains a pure "market order" type. Hasbrouck and Saar (2004) analyze a similar trading system as we do and use the same classification.
yet been executed. Trading takes place anonymously, i.e. the details of a direct transaction are reported only to the participating traders.
However, the trading screen displays the cumulative buy and sell volume for the actual trading session and the last traded transaction (volume and price) and thus allows market participants to infer the volume and direction of the last trade(s). In addition -similar to the trading systems EBS or
Reuters -the best bid and offer price plus respective volumes are given on the trading screen. Therefore, we distinguish between "ordinary limit orders", which are priced outside or at the best bid or ask (and thus line up in the order book invisible to the market) and aggressively priced limit orders, in short: "APL orders". The latter are placed within the prevailing spread and are thus directly visible on everybody's trading screen.
Data
The analysis below employs a unique data set collected at the Russian inter-dealer market for sharing. Most of RUR/USD trading may occur bilaterally and it has to be expected in particular that a lot of informed trading is channeled this way and thus not covered by our data (see e.g. Melvin and Wen, 2004) . 11 This heightens the stakes for our analysis. Nevertheless, informed traders may also choose the UTS as it is probably the most liquid market.
The initiator of a deal, i.e. whether it is buyer or seller initiated, is available from the data, so that we do not need to use a classification algorithm. Most importantly, each event in the data set can be allocated to the region of the initiator and the counterparty respectively. This permits a regional grouping of trades and traders which is a major vehicle for our analyses and, to the best of our knowledge, unique for an electronic currency market.
From the raw data we construct an event time data set that contains the midquote, a signed transaction indicator, signed transaction volume, the inside spread, aggregate buy and sell volume queued in the order book, the number of buy and sell limit orders outstanding and several measures of entered limit order flows which we detail later. Furthermore, the same series is also sampled at a frequency of thirty seconds to eliminate some of the microstructure noise associated with tick data.
Descriptive statistics
Intraday dynamics of this foreign exchange market follow diurnality patterns that are well in line with previous studies concerning electronic order markets in currency (see e.g. Payne, 2003) and stock markets (see e.g. Chung, van Ness and van Ness, 1999) . Table 1 , Panel A presents descriptive statistics on the evolution of the order book and order size over the UTS for non-overlapping five minute intervals. When measured by the number of ask and bid orders outstanding we get an inverted U-shaped pattern which is less pronounced for volume outstanding. This should be due to the fact that our market does not trade continuously but only for one hour per day so that customer orders pile up until market opening. When the market opens the order book fills very quickly within the first minute to a high level of volume on both sides of the book. It seems to be a consequence that some activity figures, such as volume traded (i.e. the sum of market orders in an interval), tend to fall over time. The same was also found for electronic currency markets in Tokyo operating on EBS (Ito and Hashimoto, 2004) . Despite this fact, the spread shows the expected U-shaped pattern.
Panel B of Table 1 shows return statistics for midquote changes, also calculated over five minute intervals. We find the typical unconditional means of nearly zero for midquote returns and a strong and significant autocorrelation in first moments. The variance is highest at the beginning and at the end of the UTS, which gives rise to the typical intraday pattern in return volatility. As expected, midquote returns are also heavily fat-tailed. Lastly, midquote return residual variance is serially correlated.
11 Unfortunately, the BIS (2002) 
Characteristics of regions
Next, we focus on the local information hypothesis by grouping orders according to their origin from eight regions in Russia. The most useful cut is between orders from the center regions Moscow and St. Petersburg versus orders from the six other non-center regions. Accordingly, we call orders originating from the centers "C-orders", their trades "C-trades", their traders "C-traders" and the others "NC-orders" etc.
14 Russia's centers in terms of concentration of decision makers are Moscow, the capital city, and St. Petersburg. These two regions are also the financial centers, as Moscow has the highest number of, the largest and the most profitable banks in the country, including foreign banks. Moreover, Moscow also takes the lead in international orientation, as its banks have the highest customer foreign currency account volume in absolute and relative terms. St. Petersburg ranks second in all of these categories in Russia. In contrast to these financial indicators, industrial production as a proxy of economic activity is more evenly distributed among the eight regions which are differentiated by Russian statistics.
Whereas the two center regions contribute 39% to total industrial production, they host for example 85% of all banks.
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plete information on the eight regional exchanges. 12 Russian GDP was 345.6 bn. USD in 2002, and 10,400 bn. USD for the United States. Thus, Russia's economy was one thirtieth the size of the latter. 13 Interbank spread in the most liquid USD/EUR market is 1 or 2 pips but this has to be put in relation to an exchange rate of about 1. From this perspective, the Russian spread is low. 14 This reliance on an ex ante characteristic is an advantage because many studies that are interested in information differences have to rely on ex post identification, so that trades are classified as informed that have been identified through some sort of data-based algorithm (see e.g. the discussion in Campbell, Ramadorai and Vuolteenaho, 2005) . 15 Exact data are available from the authors on request.
Accordingly, if there is any local information concerning exchange rates in Russia it will be concentrated in the two center regions and thus among the C-orders. 16 Of course, there will be also liquidity trades in the center regions and possibly informed trades in the non-center, peripheral regions which makes our measure of information imprecise. As a consequence, we cannot expect clear-cut results as in an experimental situation (see Bloomfield, O'Hara and Saar, 2005) . If, however, our necessarily imprecise distinction between more and less informed orders yields a plausible outcome, the result would seem to be even more credible.
As a final prerequisite for the following analysis we provide additional details about C-and NCtraders in Table 2 . C-traders are 64% of the population; traders from Moscow alone have a share of 47%. Table 3 also gives volumes and observation numbers for each of the three order types -i.e. market, APL and ordinary limit orders -and trading profits. As one expects for informed trade, we find that C-traders use more market than limit orders whereas NC-traders do the opposite (see e.g. Bloomfield, O'Hara and Saar, 2005, for expectations on informed trade). Moreover, C-traders trade and submit higher volumes than NC-traders as measured per trader and per event.
There is also scant evidence that traders from center regions earn higher profits (see Table 2 ).
Due to our data, however, profit calculation has three limitations: first, information is restricted to earnings and not to costs, second, we do not know inventories and third, we only know the interbanking leg of transactions but have no information about the customer leg. So calculations are indicative at best. Assuming that trading banks keep their inventories arising from trading at the UTS until the next day, we calculate the profit figures. Table 2 also shows, unexpectedly so from traditional microstructure theory, that C-traders extensively use limit orders and that NC-traders also make heavy use of market orders. Furthermore, about one quarter of limit orders are priced aggressively. These APL orders are particularly interesting since they have much higher fill rates. Whereas APL orders are filled by about 75%, only 45% of ordinary limit orders are filled. The traditional argument against the use of limit orders by informed traders is the fact that their execution is not guaranteed. So why should informed traders risk nonexecution when they are able to capitalize on their information via market orders? A natural answer is that limit orders are cheaper. Accordingly, it is intuitive to assume that informed traders use APL orders to improve their probability of execution while avoiding payment of the full market spread. In this trade-off between immediacy and costs APL orders obviously stand between market orders and ordinary limit orders. This idea is underscored by the different speed of order execution, i.e. survival probabilities of aggressively priced and ordinary limit orders. After 30 seconds, for example, about 80% of executed APL orders are done but only about 50% of ordinary limit orders. This pattern holds for C-and NC-traders.
Price impact of regional groups
In this section we examine the price impact of order flow on returns and show that it significantly differs for C-versus NC-traders. Due to the more disaggregated data we use, the standard VARframework needs some adjustment, which is motivated in Section 3.1. The application in Section 3.2 provides the main results which are controlled by further structural VARs in Section 3.3.
Econometric approach
To measure the long-run impact of market and limit order flow shocks on spot midquotes we use vector autoregressions, which have been successfully applied in several microstructure settings and serve as a tool to test for informed trading. While Hasbrouck (1991) and Payne (2003) use a structural VAR (SVAR) to explicitly account for the influence of market order flow on returns, Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) use a restricted VAR in the sense that they regress bond yields on past common factors to get a more parsimonious structure. As a reference for our work we briefly review the approach of Payne (2003) , which is an application of Hasbrouck (1991) . A bivariate SVAR is employed
where Γ(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator and the structural assumption is contained in the upper right element of the A matrix, namely that (market) order flow x t causes midquote returns r t . B is a diagonal matrix and the structural shocks ε t are assumed to be mutually and serially uncorrelated at all leads and lags with unit variances. Inverting the system yields the VMA representation, which can be used for computing impulse-responses and variance decompositions.
However, since we are dealing with five variables (returns and four flows) it is not possible to apply this setup directly. Therefore, our approach is twofold: we first employ a reduced form VAR since a priori there is little theoretical guidance on the interrelations of returns, limit and market order flows of different trader groups. Second, in Section 3.3, we employ SVARs with different identifying assumptions to check whether results obtained so far are robust to common news shocks (Evans and Lyons, 2006) and feedback trading (Daníelsson and Love, 2006) . Moreover, as mentioned before, we opt to minimize the exposure to noise in our data by aggregating our tick-by-tick data into (nonoverlapping) intervals of thirty seconds.
Since we are interested in price impacts of both market and APL orders and the interrelations of different order types, we construct order flow variables for both order types. Market order flow is measured the standard way: buyer initiated trades occurring at the ask are coded as positive whereas seller initiated trades occurring at the bid are coded as the negative of the trade size. In the case of APL orders, a bid is coded as the positive of the submitted volume whereas ask side orders are coded as the negative of the submitted volume. 
Reduced form VARs
This section reports results from reduced form VARs with midquote returns and all four flow variables. We find that both flow variables of C-traders have a significant and permanent effect on midquotes whereas flows of NC-traders only have transitory price impact.
In order to measure the impact of order flows on midquote returns we employ the following re-
where Γ(L) is the usual matrix polynomial in the lag operator and υ t is a (5×1) vector of shocks. The above representation can be inverted to obtain responses of the dependent variables after a shock in υ t (see e.g. Lütkepohl, 2005) . Estimation proceeds via OLS and we employ a bootstrap with 200 replica-18 Many studies (e.g. Bjønnes and Rime, 2005) use signed transaction indicators. Our results obtained for signed volume of flows are qualitatively unchanged if we use signed transaction indicators instead. tions throughout the following analyses to obtain standard errors for the impulse-responses. Impulseresponses themselves are generalized impulse-responses which do not depend on the ordering of the variables since orthogonalization of shocks is not necessary in this framework (see Pesaran and Shin, 1998 , for the following discussion). The generalized impulse-response function for some horizon n is computed by the difference between the conditional expectation of the system given that the jth variable is shocked by an amount δ at time t and the expectation without such a shock:
where Ω t denotes the information set at time t. Since the impulse-response is calculated from the VMA representation y t = G 1 υ t-1 + G 2 υ t-2 + … we need to obtain the conditional expectation of the shock vector υ t given that there is a shock in variable j. Under multivariate normality of the shock vector this conditional expectation is
where Σ is the covariance matrix of the shocks, σ jj denotes the variance of shock j and e j is a selection (column) vector with all elements equal to zero except for the jth element which equals unity. Hence, the (non scaled) impulse-response for horizon n and a shock in variable j is the expression in (4) multiplied with the corresponding coefficient matrix from the VMA representation for this horizon, G n , so ,...
In our empirical applications below, we use the same shock δ j =δ, j=2,…,5, for all four order flow measures which equals the size of a one standard deviation shock of C-traders' market order flow. This procedure serves to make results comparable across the two order types and across the two trader groups.
The system in (2) is clearly a reduced form of possibly complicated microstructural effects that determine the dynamic interplay between two different groups and flows of two different forms of orders. Therefore, results obtained from (2) are used as a benchmark which can be compared to the results from structural models employed in the next section. However, since structural assumptions are subject to the judgment of the researcher it seems useful to have a more unbiased benchmark like the one presented here.
As a first useful exercise, we plot cumulative impulse-responses of midquote returns to a one standard deviation shock in each of the four flow variables in Figure 2 . As can be inferred, both mar-ket and APL flows of informed traders have a significant and permanent long-run impact on midquotes, which is consistent with information effects (Hasbrouck, 1991) . Furthermore, the price impact of about 0.0016% for a one standard deviation shock in the market order flow of C-traders translates into a permanent effect on the midquote of about 5 pips. Given an average half-spread of about 8.5 pips, one may conclude that nearly 60% of the spread compensates for asymmetric information which is a reasonable figure for FX markets (see Payne, 2003 (Hasbrouck, 1991) . 20 This can be most clearly seen for the impact of their market order flow which has a significant initial price impact (similar in magnitude to that of C-traders), which significantly moves midquote returns for some minutes but then vanishes and gets insignificant over intermediate horizons. This is in sharp contrast to the C-traders, whose price impact rises over time,
indicating that market participants may learn from their order flow.
How can these finding be interpreted? First, the fact that both order types are informative for future price movements underscores recent findings in the literature (e.g. Kaniel and Liu, 2006 ) that at least certain limit orders carry information for future price movements. Second, our results strengthen the finding of Hasbrouck and Saar (2004) that certain kinds of limit orders are closer substitutes to market orders than to traditional, liquidity supplying limit orders.
Motivated by the high returns at the beginning and the end of trading, we also run VARs on four sub-samples sorted by the time of the trading session, i.e. we estimate the VAR on the first fifteen minutes of the trading sessions, then on minutes 16 to 30 and so on. Results are given in Table 3 , Panel A. The price impacts vary with the time of the day but the general result is unchanged, i.e. both C-traders' flows have a significant permanent effect in midquotes whereas NC-traders' flows do not.
The R 2 s for the reduced form VARs are quite high, ranging from 8% to about 20%. Joint tests for autocorrelation up to the tenth lag do not indicate significant serial correlation in the residual series.
Panel B reports residual autocorrelation in the upper triangular part along with respective p-values in 19 For the graphical expositions we truncate the cumulative impulse responses at a horizon of 15 (i.e. seven and a half minutes) after which they stay flat. Results on long-run impacts shown in tables are exact numbers obtained analytically (see Lütkepohl, 2005) . 20 As a robustness exercise (not shown here), using also ordinary limit order flows does not yield significant price impacts for both trader groups.
the lower triangular part. Obviously, there is significant contemporaneous correlation between midquote returns and each of the flows' residuals which will be discussed further in the next section.
Structural VAR analysis, common news shocks and feedback trading
This section extends the reduced form VAR to structural VARs to account for effects recently discussed in the literature, namely common news shocks (Evans and Lyons, 2006) and feedback trading (Evans and Lyons, 2002a, Daníelsson and Love, 2006) . As was seen in Table 3 , Panel B, there is significant residual correlation which may be used to identify structural parameters associated with these two concepts.
First, we employ a structural VAR of the following form Again, we first plot cumulative impulse-responses for this system in Figure 3 . As can be seen, the results obtained so far are robust to allowing spillovers from return shocks to order flow shocks.
NC-traders' flows still only have transitory price impact (market orders) or no significant impact at all (APL orders). More detailed results are shown in Table 4 , Panel A. According to the first row, the sum of coefficient estimates for lagged order flows is only significantly positive for flows of C-traders. The same is true for the analytical cumulative impulse-responses shown in the second column. The forecast variance decompositions show that 38% of the explained variance comes from C-traders' market order flow and that more than 9% comes from APL order flow of the same group. NC-traders make up for about 10% of explained variance in total. Finally, the χ 2 -test for overidentifying restrictions is not rejected and there is no evidence of autocorrelation in residuals.
Moreover, the estimated direct price impact coefficients α i show that both flows from C-traders and market order flow from NC-traders are significantly positive. As discussed above, the latter seems to be a pure liquidity effect since there is no significant permanent impact on returns for NC-traders' market order flow. Interestingly, the spillover coefficients δ i are significantly negative for market orders and not significant for APL-orders. Looking at the sizes of the spillover coefficients, however, the reaction of C-traders on common news is several times larger than that of NC-traders, suggesting that common news shocks are more pronouncedly processed by C-traders.
As a second exercise, we introduce feedback trading by C-traders to the SVAR while still allowing for the influence of common news on order flows. Since the system specified in (6) leaves two degrees of freedom, we have to restrict ourselves to two feedback trading coefficients. We allow contemporaneous returns to influence both order flows of C-traders only because these traders are more active and might thus pursue feedback trading strategies. Furthermore, these traders are the only ones who have a significant price impact so it would be more interesting to see whether their permanent price impact vanishes when accounting for contemporaneous feedback from returns to order flow.
However, given the existing literature, this is not very likely. Evans and Lyons (2002a) show that the feedback effect is rather negative than positive and Daníelsson and Love (2006) find feedback trading effects in VARs to be of little importance for aggregation intervals of up to one minute. However, in order to account for this possibility we modify the SVAR setup so that returns may have a direct impact on C-traders' order flow. This translates into Table 4 . The two feedback coefficients are not significantly different from zero, which might have been expected due to our relatively high sampling frequency of thirty seconds, as discussed above. Furthermore, results do not differ with respect to the overall conclusion that only C-traders' order flows have a significant long-run price impact.
However, the variance decomposition reveals that in this specification each of the two order flows from C-traders account for an equal amount of 21% of the explained variance.
All in all, the analyses show that only orders from a center (C-orders) have permanent price impact. This can be interpreted as informed trade. Orders from the periphery of Russia (NC-orders) have transitory price impact at best, which might be explained by liquidity effects that are common to all orders hitting the market regardless of the information content.
Robustness
In this section we show robustness results regarding three concerns: first, do standard VAR analyses for our market yield results comparable to earlier studies and are these results robust over time? Second, does the price impact of the C-traders' order flow vary with market conditions as predicted by microstructure theory? Third, how important is the fact that the C-traders are much larger and represent a larger share of the market than NC-traders? As we will show below, our conclusions so far, are robust towards these three concerns.
As a first exercise we give results from the standard SVAR approach in (1) responses over three sub-periods of three days, respectively. As can be seen, the long-run impact varies across the three sub-periods but has the usual shape in each three day sub-sample and always yields a significantly positive permanent price impact. We conclude from this, that our results are not driven by some extreme sub-periods but that the sample represents usual trading at the UTS.
As a second line of investigation, we also condition our price impact analyses on variables that reflect certain market conditions typically found to be important in microstructure analysis. We use transacted volume as a proxy for market activity, order book volume as a measure of market liquidity and spreads to reflect the degree of asymmetric information. Each variable is calculated for a given interval of thirty seconds. Moreover, these variables are detrended to eliminate typical intraday patterns and thus to rule out the indirect influence of time.
21 Figure 4 plots price impacts of C-traders sorted by high and low trading volume (TV), order book volume (BV) and spreads, respectively.
Again, we use the same size for both shocks to market and APL order flow and for both trader groups to ensure comparability.
As can be seen from Figure 4 , price impacts for both market and APL orders vary markedly in the sub-samples. Interestingly, APL and market orders' price impacts vary in the same direction, which underscores the idea that both are close substitutes. Furthermore, results for both order flows are consistent with standard microstructure theory: first, consider price impacts and trading activity.
Our results are consistent with the empirical findings of Dufour and Engle (2000) that market activity boosts the size of quote revisions. Results also confirm the theory of Foster and Viswanathan (1990) , who model high volume as a result of informed trading, which deters the uninformed from trading and also comply with the "Mixture of Distribution Hypothesis" (Clark, 1973) which posits that trading volume and return variance are both driven by an unobservable factor related to news diffusion. Therefore, higher price impact during intervals of higher trading activity is consistent with informed trade.
Second, the positive relation between spreads and price impacts is intuitive since higher bid-ask spreads are thought of as compensating for adverse selection risk (see e.g. Easley and O'Hara, 1987) .
Higher spreads then imply a higher probability of informed trade and therefore higher price impacts.
Finally, higher liquidity supply as measured by the size of the order book naturally alleviates the price impact of trades. The same is found in Payne (2003) and underscores that our market has usual characteristics. All in all, we find that the price impact of the two order flows varies according to expectations from microstructure theory and is thus unlikely to be due to chance or an unusual trading period.
Finally, we investigate whether our results regarding C-vs. NC-traders are driven purely by the fact that C-traders are much larger and cover a much larger market share than NC-traders. In order to examine this question, we rank all C-traders according to their size in terms of total trading volume during our observation period. Next we form four C-trader groups so that each group has approximately 20% market share. The first group is made up by the largest C-traders that cover 20% of the market's trading volume, the second group is made up by the traders that cover the next 20% of total trading volume and so on. This gives us four groups of C-traders, each covering one fifth of the market and the group of NC-traders also covering approximately 20% of total trading volume. We will compare the smallest C-trader group to the NC-traders to control for the influence of trader size on our results. Both groups have a similar mean trade size (36,000 USD for the smallest C-traders vs. 35,500
for the NC-traders) and a similar number of trades in our sample (about 4,000 for the smallest Ctraders vs. 3,600 for the NC-traders) so that results for these two groups should be unaffected by size considerations.
We run VARs consisting of midquote returns and six flows: market and APL order flow of the three largest C-trader groups, market and APL order flow of the smallest C-trader group and the two flows from NC-traders. Therefore, our approach principally parallels the one of equation (2) and we only break up the x C and s C flows into the flows of the smallest 25% C-traders versus the 75% largest C-traders. We do not include flows for all four C-trader groups separately to save degrees of freedom. Figure 5 shows cumulative impulse-response functions for the smallest C-trader group and the NCtraders for both market order flow and APL order flow. 22 As can be inferred from the figure, the smallest C-traders have a permanent price impact for both order flows whereas the NC-traders' flows still do not have a permanent effect on midquotes. Notably, the impact of the smallest C-traders is lower than the overall impact of C-traders for both flows (see e.g. Figure 2 ). Again, the price impact of the smallest C-traders increases over time whereas the impact of NC-traders declines.
Conclusions
This paper supports the hypothesis that information is asymmetrically distributed between locations in foreign exchange markets. As our standard method to infer about information, we use price impact analyses to determine whether orders have transitory or permanent impact (Hasbrouck, 2006) .
If prices change temporarily, this is interpreted as indicating market frictions, such as short-term liquidity shocks. If prices, however, do not reverse after a trade to the former level, information is conveyed.
The local information hypothesis states that information may be asymmetrically distributed between different regions. Those locations which are close to centers of decision making are potentially better informed, whereas peripheral locations are expected to be rather less informed. In the Russian rouble -dollar market under review, locations being close to decision makers should be in the region of Moscow and possibly the region of St. Petersburg, the center regions. Orders from the six other regions, being quite different from the two centers according to the Russian economic statistics should be less informed on average. Fortunately, the data set of nine days country-wide interbank RUR/USD trading allows allocating orders to eight regions each. Accordingly, the local information hypothesis can be tested with exact trading data for the first time in foreign exchange.
We do, indeed, find that regions make a difference in the price impact of orders. Orders from the center regions tend to move prices permanently, i.e. they provide information. Orders from other regions, however, move prices for a few minutes only before they reverse to their former level.
Local information is so important, according to our analysis, that it even dominates conventional wisdom regarding preferred order type. Earlier studies have argued forcefully that informed traders prefer market orders and the uninformed tend to rely on limit orders (see the excellent discussion in Bloomfield, O'Hara and Saar, 2005) . Consequently, the former have price impact and the latter have not. In a novel analysis we break down this simplified distinction of two cases -market versus limit orders -into six cases, i.e. three types of orders times two types of traders, either from center regions or others. Due to this disaggregation we find that location "beats" order type. Market orders and aggressively-priced limit orders of center traders are informative whereas orders from other regions are on average never informative, whatever order type they choose.
This evidence cannot be easily explained by different order size as we measure the price impact per dollar. Moreover, we control for possible effects of common news shocks and feedback trading which might both drive results, as has been argued recently. The findings are robust to and also hold for different aggregation of trading data, for splits of the overall sample, for various market conditions and when we control for trader size.
Finally, concerns might refer to the Russian RUR/USD market, which is small compared to world leading markets. This lower transaction volume, however, basically seems to reflect the smaller size of the Russian economy and does not lead to different market statistics. Moreover, the Russian foreign exchange market uses a very similar trading technology to other leading electronic currency markets. Nevertheless, we have conducted standard tests on market behavior to see whether this market might be different; results confirm market characteristics of leading markets as examined for example by Payne (2003) .
Therefore, findings may be seen as an extension of earlier price impact analyses: we split aggregate order flow according to regions and in a further step even consider aggressively priced limit orders. Whatever analysis is performed, order flows from the center regions tend to be informed and order flows originating from other regions are not -providing strong evidence in favor of local information in foreign exchange markets. (5) give the first order autocorrelations, fifth order Ljung-Box test statistics for returns and fifth order Ljung-Box test statistics for squared residual returns respectively. Note that residual returns are calculated by using an MA (1) (4) and (5). In Panel A, the first row (Σγ i ) shows the sum of lagged price impact coefficients, e.g. the sum of all lags of C-traders' market order flow x C in the midquote return equation in column "x C ". The second row (CR) shows cumulative long-run responses of midquote returns to a one standard deviation structural shocks in the respective variable shown in the column, whereas the third row (VD(15)) shows the variance decomposition for a horizon of 15 periods, i.e. 7.5 minutes. The next row (α i ) shows the contemporaneous price impact coefficient estimates whereas the next row (δ i ) shows the estimated coefficients for the spillover from return shocks to order flows. In the last row, χ(2) denotes the test statistic for over-identification in the SVAR with two dof, AC(10) shows the LM test for autocorrelation at lag 10 and obs are the number of observations included in the estimation. Numbers in parentheses denote (bootstrap-based) standard errors for the first two rows, t-statistics for the rows α i and δ i and p-values in the last row. Stars refer to the level of significance (**,*:α≤0.01, α≤0.05). The same applies to Panel B, for the SVAR with common news shocks and feedback trading, except for the fact that ψ i denotes the feedback from returns to C-traders' order flows. 
